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Abstract
How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?
We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the
property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of
buyers’ updated expected valuations. We deﬁne the class of precision criteria following this approach
and diﬀerent notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using
supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields
a more eﬃcient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the eﬃcient level of information
since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity
between information and competition, so that both the socially eﬃcient and the auctioneer’s optimal
choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders
goes to inﬁnity.
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i1 Introduction
There are numerous situations in which a seller controls the information available to potential
buyers: a government agency soliciting bids to execute a public project, a company wanting to sell
a subsidiary (or go public), internet auctions, etc. Such situations raise important questions, such
as: should the seller make information available to bidders? How much should he make available?
As much as possible? Are his incentives to provide information aligned with social ones? How does
his choice depend on the number of potential buyers in the market?
We address these questions in a standard independent private values auction setting: an auc-
tioneer wants to sell an object to n risk-neutral bidders whose valuations are independently drawn
from a common and known distribution. Initially, bidders know the distribution but are uncertain
about their valuations. The auctioneer, prior to the auction, can supply information (in the form
of private signals) to help them obtain a more accurate estimate of their valuations. Each bidder
receives a private signal which conveys information only about his private valuation and is private
information to him. Eﬀectively, the auctioneer chooses the information structure, i.e. the joint
distribution of the private signals and valuations, so as to maximize his expected revenue from
the auction. This choice can be interpreted either as the auctioneer producing information or as
controlling access to existing information.
In order to analyze the auctioneer’s problem generally, without recourse to speciﬁc families of in-
formation structures, we need a criterion of informativeness. A natural candidate is Lehmann (1988)’s
criterion of eﬀectiveness which has been used in Persico (2000) and Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002)
to order information structures in the related problem where bidders choose how much information
to acquire. But, Lehmann’s, as well as other commonly used criteria of informativeness, such as
Blackwell (1955)’s, are not well suited for analyzing the auctioneer’s incentives to provide informa-
tion to bidders, since they do not pose speciﬁc constraints on the distribution of bidders expected
valuations, which is central in our problem. We propose a new family of criteria of informativeness,
that we refer to as precision criteria, and are deﬁned via the eﬀect of information on the distribu-
1tion of expected valuations. Precision criteria allow us to obtain robust results on the auctioneer’s
incentives for the provision of information and how they change with the number of bidders in the
auction.
The common characteristic of precision criteria is that they are deﬁned by the property that in
private value settings more information leads to a more spread out distribution of buyers’ updated
expected valuations. In our model, the auctioneer controls the informativeness of the signals but
does not observe their realizations. He knows that bidders use these signals to update their expected
valuations so that to him updated expected valuations are random draws from a distribution which
he can inﬂuence by choosing the degree of informativeness of the signals. Further, he knows that
due to the heterogeneity in bidder preferences an increase in the informativeness of the signals will
have an asymmetric eﬀect on bidder’s expected valuations, raising some while reducing others. So
that by increasing the informativeness of signals, the auctioneer makes the distribution of updated
expected valuations more spread out.
Precision criteria are deﬁned by this eﬀect: an information structure will be more informative
than another if its distribution of updated expected valuations is more disperse. As there are diﬀer-
ent ways in which one random variable may be more disperse than another, we will provide corre-
spondingly diﬀerent precision criteria. The main criterion used in this paper is that of supermodular
precision (sm-precision), which is deﬁned using the dispersive order of Bickel and Lehmann (1976).1
Using weaker notions of dispersion, we construct several alternative (and weaker) precision criteria,
and show that commonly used informativeness criteria only imply the weakest precision criterion
and correspondingly limited comparative static results.
Returning to the auctioneer’s problem, we suppose the auctioneer can choose at some cost from
a general class of information structures ranked in terms of their informativeness. We show that
if information structures are ordered by precision criteria, we can also order the total surplus they
1In addition to deﬁning supermodular-precision, in the Appendix we identify a condition stated in terms of in-
formation structures (rather than the distribution of expected valuations) that is suﬃcient to order information
structures in terms of supermodular-precision. This condition is the mirror image of Lehmann (1988)’s characteriza-
tion of greater eﬀectiveness.
2generate and, in certain cases, the expected price. Moreover, the link between precision criteria
and the outcome of the auction allows us to analyze the incentives of the auctioneer to provide
information. We will now present the three main results obtained using supermodular precision. At
the end, we introduce weaker precision criteria and discuss how they aﬀect these results. Until then,
to improve readability, we use the generic term ‘precision’ in the text to also refer to supermodular
precision whenever it does not generate ambiguity.
The ﬁrst result is that more precision raises the eﬃciency of the allocation. We show that
increasing the precision of the information structure increases the surplus of the allocation summa-
rized by the expected valuation of the winning bidder. Hence, if granting access to information is
costless, then it is eﬃcient to give full access to all available information. If granting access is costly,
then there is a trade-oﬀ between increasing the surplus from the allocation versus increasing costs.
The second result is that private and social incentives for the provision of information are
not aligned. The auctioneer faces two opposing forces when deciding the precision of the signals:
more precision improves the eﬃciency of the allocation, which increases expected revenues, while
also increasing informational rents, which reduces them. Informational rents increase the cost of
providing information, and the auctioneer optimally chooses an ineﬃcient level of sm-precision.
The third result is that information and competition are complements in the following sense:
total surplus and the auctioneer’s expected revenue are supermodular in the number of bidders
and the informativeness of the information structure in terms of sm-precision. This implies that
the socially eﬃcient and the auctioneer’s optimal choice of sm-precision are increasing in the level
of competition measured in terms of the number of bidders in the auction. We now provide the
intuition behind this complementarity.
Total surplus is determined by the expenditure on information and the match between the
characteristics of the object and bidder preferences. An extra bidder increases the marginal value
of information since for any level of expenditure this extra bidder can generate additional eﬃciency
gains from the information.
Expected revenue is total surplus minus informational rents of the winning bidder. Private
3incentives to provide information increase with competition, because competition increases the
beneﬁts of information (the eﬃciency of the allocation) and reduces its costs (informational rents).
This complementarity does not imply that providing information to the market is always valuable to
the auctioneer. With two bidders, the negative eﬀect of information (increased informational rents)
overwhelms the gains from a better match, and the value of providing information is negative. As
the number of bidders increases, information eventually becomes valuable. Thereafter, the precision
of the information structure chosen by the auctioneer increases with competition. Finally, we show
that as the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity, informational rents disappear. Consequently total
surplus and expected revenues converge and so do the optimal and the eﬃcient levels of information.
1.1 Related Literature
The problem of information revelation by the auctioneer has been studied by Milgrom and We-
ber (1982) in an aﬃliated values setting. They establish the celebrated linkage principle. According
to the linkage principle, the expected-revenue-maximizing policy for the auctioneer is to commit to
fully and publicly announce all information he has. Ottaviani and Prat (2001) extend the logic of
the linkage principle to a market setting. A price-discriminating monopolist would like to commit to
publicly announce information that is aﬃliated with buyer valuations. Our results are very diﬀerent
since in the aﬃliated values setting bidders react symmetrically to information, while in the private
value setting bidders react asymmetrically to information—valuations instead of moving together,
become more disperse.
The basic idea that information in private value settings increases the diﬀerences between bid-
ders, which generates informational rents, already appears in Lewis and Sappington (1994)’s pio-
neering study of information revelation by a monopolist. In Lewis and Sappington (1994), buyers’
preferences over the monopolist’s product are heterogenous. The monopolist chooses how much
information to provide to buyers using a simple family of information structures. The information
provided spreads out the distribution of consumer valuations, increasing the valuation of high-value
buyers and informational rents. This leads the monopolist to select an all-or-nothing information
4strategy.
While Johnson and Myatt (forthcoming) study the problem of a monopolist’s advertising and
marketing decisions in a market setting, we consider their methodological approach to be the one
closest to ours. As in this paper, Johnson and Myatt (forthcoming) focus on the link between the
seller’s supply of information and the shape of the distribution of buyers’ expected valuations. In
Johnson and Myatt, if consumers react asymmetrically to information (advertising) provided by the
monopolist, the distribution of consumer valuations becomes more disperse, generating a rotation of
the demand curve. They show that these rotations generate a convexity in the monopolist’s proﬁts
which explains the optimality of the monopolist’s extreme choices in Lewis and Sappington (1994).
Our paper provides a general analysis of the link between information and dispersion. In particular,
we present three novel informativeness criteria based on diﬀerent notions of dispersion, one of which
(SC-dispersion) is akin to Johnson and Myatt’s notion of a rotation. SC-dispersion provides the
basis for an informativeness criterion, single-crossing precision. We show that, as a rotation is useful
in understanding the problem of costless provision of information in a market setting, single-crossing
precision is useful in an auction setting. Moreover, we determine that single-crossing precision is not
implied by the standard informativeness criteria, and that in order to obtain comparative statics
results with costly provision of information we need a stronger precision criterion.
The ﬁndings of Lewis and Sappington (1994) have their counterpart in private value auctions.
Recently, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003), Ganuza (2004) and Board (2005) show that the
asymmetric reaction of bidders to information in private value settings may lead the auctioneer
to optimally withhold information.2,3 Our informativeness criteria could be used to extend previ-
ous analysis of the seller’s information revelation decision with a much larger set of information
structures. We use it to provide a general treatment of the auctioneer’s problem in the symmetric
2Board (2005) shows that even if bidders react symmetrically to information but with diﬀerent sensitivities, the
possibility that the ranking of bidders may change can lead the auctioneer to prefer not to release any information.
3An alternative approach, pursued in Es˝ o and Szentes (2005), is to assume that the auctioneer can fully commit to
provide any given level of information precision and charge bidders for it, prior to actually revealing any information.
Thus, the auctioneer can extract all the informational rents ex-ante and the tradeoﬀ in Lewis and Sappington (1994)
vanishes.
5case.
In the current paper, the auctioneer provides information symmetrically—bidders receive pri-
vate signals with the same precision. In contrast, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003) consider the
possibility of discriminating between bidders and ﬁnd that some degree of discrimination may be
optimal. Another diﬀerence with Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003) is that in that paper the
auctioneer designs the optimal information structure, which turns out to be representable by asym-
metric partitions, that are diﬃcult to rank in terms of informativeness. In contrast, we have the
usual setup where the auctioneer chooses from a family of indexed information structures ordered in
terms of informativeness, as in Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2006)’s survey of the role of information
in mechanism design, as well as in Persico (2000) and Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002).
The current paper uses the standard approach to modeling the provision of information, i.e. via
private signals correlated with uncertain valuations. As Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003) point
out, this way of modeling is consistent with situations where the seller publicly reveals information
about the characteristics of the object/product and buyers combine it with their preferences to
determine their valuations. These valuations are private information to buyers, because they are
the only ones who know how what is known about the object matches with their preferences.
Ganuza (2004) follows this approach in a Salop setting where an auctioneer sells a good to bidders
who are located on a circle according to a uniform distribution, and he ﬁnds similar comparative
static results to ours.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 formulates the model. Section 3 discusses our approach
to ordering information structures and introduces the notion of supermodular-precision. Section 4
contains the main economic results concerning information revelation and competition in private
value auctions. In Section 5 we study the link between information and dispersion: alternative preci-
sion criteria are presented and their relationship with existing informativeness criteria is established.
This section is followed by the conclusion. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.
62 The Model
An auctioneer wants to sell an object he values at zero to one of n (ex-ante) identical risk-neutral
bidders (indexed by i = 1,...,n). Bidders’ valuations of the object are private and uncertain.
Bidder i’s realized valuation after the auction is described by a random variable, Vi. For all i =
1,...,n, Vi is independently distributed on V = [0,1] according to a common distribution H(v) =
Pr(Vi ≤ v) with mean µ.
The utility obtained by bidder i from winning the auction is linear. If the realized valuation is
vi and he makes a monetary payment of ti, the utility obtained is given by
ui(vi,ti) = vi − ti.
All bidders start with identical priors, described by H, and no other information on the object.
Hence, their expected valuations of the object will be the same and equal to µ.
The auctioneer can supply information prior to the auction. The production of information is
costly. By paying an amount δ ∈ [0,∞) the auctioneer will generate information which bidders
receive in the form of private signals (Xi)n
i=1. A higher δ generates more informative signals and δ
is public information to all bidders.
Signals are independent and identically distributed random variables. We assume that these
signals are drawn from the space of signals, X ⊆ R, and for each i = 1,...,n, Xi is informative
only about bidder i’s own true and uncertain valuation of the object, vi, and bidder i observes the
private signal Xi and no other.
By choosing how much to spend on supplying information, the auctioneer determines the infor-
mation structure, where an information structure is a joint distribution, Fδ, over signals, (Xi)n
i=1
and valuations (Vi)n
i=1, indexed by δ—we postpone until the next section, Section 3, exactly how a
greater expenditure on supplying information translates into greater informativeness.
By symmetry and independence, the joint distribution can be characterized using the distribution
7Fδ(v,x) = Pr(V ≤ v,X ≤ x) as follows:




We leave out the i subscripts on signals and valuations whenever they are clear from the context.
With a slight abuse of notation, let Fδ(x) denote the marginal distribution of X. As priors have to
be consistent with the joint distribution, the marginal distribution of V is equal to the prior H(v).
We will be comparing the eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of investment on information, and this requires
that the signals generated by diﬀerent information structures be comparable. This is done by
transforming the realized signal Xi into a new random variable, Πi, using the probability integral
transformation: Πi = Fδ(Xi). Then, Xi = F
−1
δ (Πi), where F
−1
δ is the right-continuous inverse of
the marginal distribution Fδ(x). We will assume that all random variables are non-trivial. The
new signal, Πi, has the same informational content as Xi so that we can use Πi’s instead of Xi’s.
More importantly, the marginal distribution of Πi has a very useful property: it is the uniform
distribution on [0,1] and independent of δ. Let Fδ(π|v) and Fδ(v|π) be the conditional distributions,
where Fδ(v|π) = Pr(V ≤ v|X = F
−1
δ (π)).
After the auctioneer has released the information, the awarding process takes place. To partic-
ipate in this process, each bidder combines his knowledge of δ and the realization of the private
signal, πi, to update his expected valuation of the object E[vi|πi,δ] (also referred to as the interim
valuation and denoted Wi(πi,δ)) using Bayes’ rule. The auctioneer sells the object using a second-
price sealed-bid auction. The choice of the second price auction as the awarding mechanism is done
without loss of generality as long as the conditions for the revenue equivalence theorem are present.
We abstract from reserve prices and assume that the object is always sold, so that the second price
auction (as well as all standard auctions) is the optimal mechanism.4 Summarizing, the model is
structured as follows:
1. Everyone starts with common priors over bidders’ uncertain valuations for the object.
4Ganuza and Penalva (2004) study the introduction of a reserve price using a parameterized family of information
structures. The possibility of using a reserve price gives the auctioneer an additional tool to control bidders infor-
mational rents. This raises his incentives to provide information and the optimal level of informativeness increases.
82. Prior to the auction, the auctioneer, knowing the number of bidders, n, chooses δ. This
decision becomes public information.
3. Given δ, each bidder receives a private signal πi over his valuation, and updates his valuation
of the object.
4. The second-price sealed-bid auction takes place.
We now deﬁne and discuss what it means for the auctioneer to provide more information.
3 Supermodular Precision
Given any δ > 0, signals are informative about valuations, V . We formalize this by assuming that
given two (transformed) signals π0,π ∈ [0,1], such that π > π0, receiving the larger signal, π, is good
news in the sense of Milgrom (1981).5 We assume that this condition holds for all pairs of signals
and in every information structure throughout the paper. This implies that the agent’s interim
(expected) valuations, Wi(π,δ), are a nondecreasing function of the realization of the signal, π.
Having established that for δ > 0 signals are informative about valuations we now turn to for-
malize how a higher δ leads to more informative signals. The primary approach to deﬁning the
informativeness of a structure, Fδ, is based on the pioneering work of Blackwell. Blackwell (1951)
considers the decision problem of an individual who has to choose an action based on the realiza-
tion of the signal. He deﬁnes a signal structure, Fδ, to be more informative than another, Fδ0,
if every decision maker prefers Fδ to Fδ0, and shows it is equivalent to the statistical notion of
suﬃciency. Subsequently weaker informativeness criteria (Lehmann (1988), Jewitt (1997), Athey
and Levin (2001)) focus on when all decision makers in a particular class (those with supermodular
payoﬀ functions, with single-crossing incremental returns, etc.) prefer Fδ to Fδ0. Our problem is dif-
ferent. The auctioneer will take no additional actions after choosing the information structure—the
auction mechanism takes over. The auctioneer cares about how changes in δ aﬀect the distribution
5For all π > π0, the posterior distribution of v conditional on π, Fδ(v|π), dominates the posterior distribution of
v conditional on π0, Fδ(v|π0), in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD): Fδ(·|π) ≥st Fδ(·|π0), (that
is Fδ(v|π) ≤ Fδ(v|π0) for all v ∈ V).
9function of updated expected valuations, which will determine price and allocations through the
auction mechanism.
Let Π be a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. The random variable W(Π,δ)
represents bidders’ updated expected valuations after having observed a signal from an information
structure indexed by δ. By choosing an information structure with more informative signals (a
higher δ), the distribution of W(Π,δ) will become more spread out.6 Intuitively, this is because the
updated expected valuation combines the realization of the signal with the prior and assigns more
weight to the signal if it is a more accurate estimate of the true valuation. Then, more informative
signals lead to updated expected valuations which are more sensitive to the realization of the signal,
and hence, to a more spread out distribution of W(Π,δ).
While all previous informativeness criteria lead to a more spread out distribution of W(Π,δ),
our informativeness criteria are deﬁned by requiring that this spreading out takes place in a speciﬁc
way. The ﬁrst of such criteria, supermodular-precision, orders information structures when the
distribution of expected valuations generated by each of the information structures can be ordered
according to Bickel-Lehmann dispersion:
Deﬁnition 1 (Bickel-Lehmann (1976)) A random variable X with cumulative distribution func-
tion F is said to be more Bickel-Lehmann disperse than another random variable Y with cumulative






Bickel-Lehmann dispersion deﬁnes an ordering over distribution functions which implies further
orderings of the distributions of their ﬁrst and second order statistics, two crucial variables in our
analysis.7,8
6Consider extreme cases: with no information the distribution of expected valuations is concentrated at the
expected value, µ; if valuations were revealed perfectly, the distribution of expected valuations would be the true
distribution of valuations.
7For an overview of results relating dispersion and order statistics see Shaked and Shantikumar (1994).
8Despite the importance of dispersion in statistics, Bickel-Lehmann dispersion has been used rarely in eco-
nomics. An interesting application of this concept to the problem of income inequality can be found in Eckwert
and Zilcha (2005).
10Then, an information structure, Fδ, is more informative, in the sense of supermodular-precision
(sm-precision), than another, Fδ0, if the distribution of updated expected valuations from Fδ is
more Bickel-Lehmann disperse than that from Fδ0. The criterion of supermodular precision owes
its name to the fact that its deﬁnition can be most conveniently expressed using the familiar notion
of supermodularity:
Deﬁnition 2 (SM-Precision) The information structure Fδ is more informative in terms of sm-






The intuition is that more information in terms of sm-precision increases the slope of expected




Figure 1: Precision and expected valuations
When comparing two signals from the same information structure, we said that a higher signal
is better news than a low signal because it raises bidder’s expected valuations. As W(π,δ) and
W(π,δ
0) cross, we can think of increasing sm-precision as making low signals worse news and high
11signals better news.9
Economists are more familiar with a diﬀerent and yet related notion of ‘spread out’ distributions:
Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SOSD).10 Dispersion is a stronger condition than SOSD:
Remark 1 Let Fδ be more informative in terms of sm-precision than Fδ0, then W(Πi,δ) is domi-
nated by W(Π0
i,δ
0) in the sense of SOSD.
To illustrate our concept, we look at two families of information structures that are ordered
according to sm-precision and are commonly used in the existing literature.
Example 1: Let V be normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2
v, and let the distribution
of the signal, X, conditional on the true valuation, v, be the realization of the valuation v plus a
noise term, δ, which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
δ. The variance of the
noise term orders these information structures in the usual way: the information structure with
lower variance of the noise term is more informative in terms of sm-precision.
Example 2: Let V be distributed according to the prior distribution H(v) with mean µ. The
signal, X, represents the bidder’s valuation V , but the signal reveals the truth, i.e. v = x, with
probability δ, and with the complementary probability the signal is false. We assume that when the
signal is false it is pure noise, distributed according to the prior, H(v), and independently of v. Thus,
for all values of δ, the signal, X, is distributed according to H(v). An increase in δ, the probability
that the signal reveals the truth, leads to greater informativeness in terms of sm-precision.
In the Appendix, we characterize sm-precision further by providing a suﬃcient condition for
greater informativeness in terms of sm-precision based on the properties of the joint distribution
function of signals and valuations. In the next section, we use sm-precision to study the auctioneer’s
information revelation problem.
9The law of iterated expectations implies E[W(Π,δ)] = E[W(Π,δ
0)] = µ, so that if W(π,δ) and W(π,δ
0) were
diﬀerentiable, they would cross at a single point (as in Figure 1). In general, W(π,δ)−W(π,δ
0) is monotone increasing
and changes sign once.
10In section 5, we use SOSD to characterize a novel informativeness criterion (integral-precision). The formal
deﬁnition of SOSD is presented there.
124 Releasing Information
In this section, we will use the sm-precision criterion to study social and private incentives to release
information, and how they are aﬀected by competition.
4.1 The Eﬃcient Release of Information
The eﬃcient level of sm-precision is that which maximizes total surplus at the time of the information
release. In our setup, total surplus is deﬁned as the sum of the auctioneer’s revenue and the expected
interim utility of the bidder with the highest expected valuation at the time of the auction. As the
price paid for the object is a pure transfer from the auctioneer to the winning bidder, total surplus is
the expected valuation of the object by the winning bidder minus the cost of providing information.
We ﬁrst focus on the expected valuation of the winning bidder.
Denote the highest realization of the signal by x1, so that π1 ≡ Fδ(x1). The winner of the auction
will be the bidder receiving π1 so that his expected valuation is: V1(n,δ) = E[W(Π1,δ)]—the
notation makes explicit the number of bidders as we shall be studying the eﬀect of changing n. Let
U1:n(p) be the cumulative distribution function of the ﬁrst order statistic of n independent uniform
random variables on [0,1]. Because the transformed signals Πi are independent and uniformly





As the auctioneer increases the precision of the information structure this expectation increases:
Theorem 1 The expected valuation of the winning bidder is nondecreasing in the informativeness
of the information structure in terms of sm-precision, δ.
Hence, we can compare the expected surplus generated from the allocation (the expected val-
uation of the winning bidder) under two diﬀerent structures ordered in terms of sm-precision: the
more precise information structure generates greater surplus. In Section 5 we will consider weaker
precision criteria, the weakest of which (based on SOSD) is implied by all standard informativeness
13criteria. Theorem 1 holds using the weakest precision criterion. The intuition behind this result is
that more information improves the matching between the features of the object and the preferences
of the winning bidder (and hence the expected surplus).
Theorem 1 implies that if the provision of information is costless, it is eﬃcient to release all
available information. With costly information, the trade-oﬀ faced when choosing the eﬃcient level
of precision, δ





V1(n,δ) − δ (1)
The next theorem states the relationship between the eﬃcient level of sm-precision and the level
of competition.
Theorem 2 Total surplus is supermodular in the informativeness of the information structure in
terms of sm-precision, δ, and the number of bidders, n.
Theorem 2 states that the diﬀerence in terms of expected surplus between two information
structures ordered in terms of sm-precision is larger the larger the number of bidders. So that
the larger the number of bidders, the larger the social value of information. The intuition is that
having more draws from the pool of bidder preferences increases the social incentives to improve the
matching between the object and bidder preferences by increasing precision. Consequently, with
ﬁercer competition it is eﬃcient to spend more on the provision of information.
Corollary 1 The eﬃcient level of sm-precision, δ
E, is nondecreasing in the number of bidders.
4.2 The Auctioneer’s Optimal Information Release
Having characterized the eﬃcient level of sm-precision, we now turn to the auctioneer’s problem:
choosing the level of precision so as to maximize expected revenue from the auction.
Let x2 denote the second-highest signal, so that π2 ≡ Fδ(x2). The price in the second-price auc-
tion is determined by the bidder receiving π2. Thus, the expected price is: V2(n,δ) = E[W(Π2,δ)].
14Let U2:n(p) be the cumulative distribution function of the second order statistic of n independent
uniform random variables on [0,1]. U2:n(p) is the cumulative distribution function of Π2. The





Theorem 1 shows that increasing the precision of the information structure always improves eﬃ-
ciency. The eﬀect of increasing precision on the expected price depends on the level of competition.
Proposition 1 Suppose δ > δ
0, (i) for n = 2, the expected price is nonincreasing in the informa-
tiveness of the information structure in terms of sm-precision, V2(2,δ) ≤ V2(2,δ
0). On the other
hand, (ii) for all δ
0 < δ, there exists n0 such that for all n > n0, the expected price is nondecreasing
in the informativeness of the information structure in terms of sm-precision, V2(n,δ) ≥ V2(n,δ
0).
Notice that if the number of bidders is small enough, increasing the precision of the information
structure can reduce the expected price. Then, even if information is costless, the auctioneer
prefers not to release any information. Eventually, when the number of bidders is suﬃciently high,
information becomes valuable to the auctioneer.11 The intuition behind this result comes from
two eﬀects of increasing precision on the price: it increases the willingness to pay by the winning
bidder, which increases the price, but it also increases informational rents, which lower the price.
We proceed to demonstrate this second eﬀect.
The expected informational rents of the winning bidder, Rw(n,δ), are the diﬀerence between the
expected valuation of the winning bidder and that of the bidder with the second highest realization
of the private signal:
Rw(n,δ) = V1(n,δ) − V2(n,δ)
Proposition 2 The expected informational rents of the winning bidder are nondecreasing in the
informativeness of the information structure in terms of sm-precision, δ.
11A related result can be found in Board (2005). He shows that the auctioneer, when deciding whether or not
to provide information an additional piece of information, will always choose not to reveal it if there are only two
bidders. He also shows that as the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity, the information will be revealed.
15Greater sm-precision makes the distribution of expected valuations more disperse, i.e. it makes
bidders more heterogeneous, which translates into higher informational rents for the winning bid-
der.12
The auctioneer’s problem is to choose the level of precision, δ
A, that maximizes his expected




V2(n,δ) − δ, (2)
We ﬁnd that, as in the problem of maximizing total surplus, there is a complementarity between
the level of sm-precision and the number of bidders.
Theorem 3 The auctioneer’s expected proﬁts are supermodular in the informativeness of the in-
formation structure in terms of sm-precision, δ, and the number of bidders, n.
The diﬀerence between the expected proﬁts generated by two information structures ordered in
terms of sm-precision is larger the larger the number of bidders. Therefore, more bidders increase
the incentives of the auctioneer to provide information.
Corollary 2 The optimal level of sm-precision, δ
A, is nondecreasing in the number of bidders, n.
4.3 Optimal vs. Eﬃcient Provision of Information
Finally, we compare private incentives to provide information with social ones.
Theorem 4 The optimal level of informativeness of the information structure, in terms of sm-
precision, is lower than the eﬃcient level: δ
A ≤ δ
E. The diﬀerence between the eﬃcient and the
optimal level converges to 0 as the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity.
12Our results are linked to the relationship between the Bickel-Lehmann dispersive order and order statistics. In
particular, Proposition 2 can be proven using Theorem 2.B.15 in Shaked and Shantikumar (1994), which says that
if one random variable, X, is more Bickel-Lehmann disperse than another, Y , the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and
second order statistic from a sample of n independent draws of X stochastically dominates the same diﬀerence from
a sample of n draws of Y . Our strategy for proving results on information in auctions does not make explicit use of
the properties of the dispersive order over order statistics. This allows us to explore weaker dispersion criteria and to
obtain results related to the relationship between Bickel-Lehmann dispersive order and the distribution of ﬁrst and
second order statistics, that as far as we know, cannot be found in the statistics literature.




V1(n,δ) − δ − Rw(n,δ)
This formulation clariﬁes the trade-oﬀ faced by the auctioneer when providing information to the
market. On the one hand, when the auctioneer increases precision, the eﬃciency of the allocation
goes up (V1(n,δ) is nondecreasing in δ – Theorem 1). On the other hand, the increase in precision
also raises the informational rents of the winning bidder (Rw(n,δ) is nondecreasing in δ—Proposition
2). The optimal balance of these two opposing eﬀects leads the auctioneer to provide lower precision
than would be eﬃcient. In other words, the auctioneer will restrict the information released to
the market in order to make bidders more homogeneous, with the underlying goal of intensifying
competition and increasing his expected revenue.
Competition increases the positive eﬀect of precision on expected revenues, increasing the eﬃ-
ciency of the allocation, while it reduces the negative eﬀect, informational rents. The compounded
eﬀect is to increase the incentives of the auctioneer to reveal information so that as the number of
bidders increases so does the optimal amount of precision. In the limit, as the number of bidders
goes to inﬁnity, informational rents disappear and with them the diﬀerence between the eﬃcient
and the optimal level of sm-precision.
5 Weaker Precision Criteria
In this section, we introduce weaker precision criteria, compare them with standard informativeness
criteria, and discuss how previous results are aﬀected by using informativeness criteria other than
sm-precision.
Precision criteria establish that an information structure is more informative than another
if it leads to a more disperse distribution of expected valuations. Our central criterion, sm-
precision, requires that the distribution of expected valuations must be ordered in the sense of
Bickel-Lehmann dispersion. To deﬁne additional informativeness criteria we consider alternative
dispersive orders. We concentrate on: single-crossing dispersion (related to the idea of ‘more dan-
17gerous’13 random variables), and Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SOSD).
Consider two random variables, X with cumulative distribution function F, ﬁnite mean and
support on A ⊆ R, and Y with cumulative distribution function G, ﬁnite mean and support on
B ⊆ R.
Deﬁnition 3 (SC-Dispersion) X is dominated in terms of single-crossing dispersion by Y, if for
all z and z0 ∈ R, z > z0
F(z
0) − G(z
0) ≤ (<) 0 =⇒ F(z) − G(z) ≤ (<) 0
Deﬁnition 4 (SOSD) X is dominated in terms of second order stochastic dominance (SOSD) by







In the same way we have used Bickel-Lehmann dispersion to deﬁne sm-precision, we can de-
ﬁne single-crossing precision and integral-precision using single-crossing dispersion and SOSD: an
information structure, Fδ, is more single-crossing precise (integral-precise) than another, Fδ0, if the
distribution of updated expected valuations from Fδ dominates according to single-crossing disper-
sive order (SOSD) that from Fδ0. As with sm-precision, sc-precision and integral precision can be
most conveniently expressed using the expected valuation function:14
Deﬁnition 5 (SC-Precision) The information structure Fδ is more informative in terms of single-




0) ≥ (>) 0 =⇒ W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0) ≥ (>) 0.
13The concept of dispersion based on cumulative distribution functions that cross once appears in Karlin and
Novikoﬀ (1963). The concept is very seldom used and the nomenclature comes from actuarial science (where the
notion was introduced by Ohlin (1969)). The notion of a rotation introduced in Johnson and Myatt (forthcoming)
is a smooth version of single-crossing cdf’s. .
14The relationship between dispersive orders and diﬀerences in expected valuation functions is based on the the
fact that if we let F be the cumulative distribution functions of W(Π,δ), then F(v) is the inverse of W(π,δ), i.e.
F(v) = π iﬀ v = W(π,δ). Based on this fact, one can derive the equivalence between using dispersive orders on the
distributions of expected valuations and using properties of the expected valuation function.
18Deﬁnition 6 (Integral-Precision) The information structure Fδ is more informative in terms





Just by simple inspection of the deﬁnitions of sm-precision and sc-precision, we can conclude




0 (W(p,δ) − W(p,δ
0))dp = 0, which leads to the conclusion that sc-precision implies
SOSD. Hence, our informativeness criteria are ordered: sm-precision implies sc-precision, which
implies integral-precision-15
5.1 Precision and Standard Informativeness Criteria
As discussed above, standard informativeness criteria are based on the value of information for an in-
dividual decision maker (Blackwell (1951), Lehmann (1988), Jewitt (1997), Athey and Levin (2001)).
Athey and Levin (2001) present necessary and suﬃcient conditions for all decision makers with dif-
ferent classes of payoﬀ functions to prefer one information structure over another. If we restrict
attention to the class of decision makers with nondecreasing incremental returns, the necessary
and suﬃcient condition is denoted the MIO-ND condition.16 Blackwell’s notion is suﬃcient for
information to be valuable for all decision makers which makes it stronger than both Athey and
Levin’s and Lehmann’s. Also, for two information structures to be ordered in terms of Lehmann’s
informativeness criterion they have to satisfy the condition:
ˆ γ(v,π) = F
−1
δ (Fδ0(π|v)|v) is nondecreasing in v, foreachπ,
15We could obtain this result also by comparing the dispersion orders. In our setting in which we can concentrate
in comparing random variables with the same mean, it can be shown that Bickel-Lehmann dispersion implies single-
crossing dispersion, which implies SOSD.
16We use the following version of the MIO-ND condition in Athey and Levin (2001):
Deﬁnition 7 (MIO-ND) The information structure Fδ is more informative than Fδ0 according to MIO-ND if for
all v ∈ V and π ∈ [0,1], Fδ0(v|X ≤ F
−1
δ0 (π)) ≤ Fδ(v|X ≤ F
−1
δ (π))
19and this implies the MIO-ND condition, which makes Athey and Levin’s the weakest informativeness
criterion.17
We can now relate these notions of information with the conditions stated above.
Proposition 3 (i) Blackwell’s informativeness criterion does not imply signals are more sc-precise,
and (ii) MIO-ND implies signals are more integral-precise.
Hence, none of the standard notions of informativeness imply sc-precision, and all standard
notions of informativeness imply integral-precision.
5.2 Weakening Informativeness and PV Auctions
We have assumed that the provision of information is costly. Then we know (from Milgrom and
Shannon (1994)) that to ensure the quasisupermodularity of total surplus and expected revenue,
we need supermodularity of the functions V1(n,δ) and V2(n,δ). Among our three precision criteria
(sm-precision, sc-precision and integral-precision), only the strongest one, sm-precision, ensures
the supermodularity of V1(n,δ) and V2(n,δ). However some comparative static results can be
obtained using sc-precision and integral-precision in a framework where the provision of information
is costless.
If a higher δ only implies the information structure is more integral-precise, Theorem 1 holds.
Hence, in a setup with costless provision of information, the eﬃcient policy is full information
disclosure. The results of Proposition 1 are also valid: if the number of bidders is two, information
has a negative value, and eventually, when there is suﬃcient competition, information becomes
valuable. Also, Theorem 4 holds: as the eﬃcient information revelation strategy is full disclosure,
and information may lower the expected price the incentives of the auctioneer to provide information
will be weakly lower than the eﬃcient ones. Furthermore, from the second part of Proposition 1
it follows that both the eﬃcient and the optimal level of information converge as the number of
bidders goes to inﬁnity.
17The proof is in Athey and Levin (2001), in the proof of Proposition 3.
20The notion of sc-precision adds on integral-precision. With sc-precision the optimal amount of
information provided by the auctioneer is weakly monotonic in the number of bidders—this follows
from the property that with sc-precision, for δ > δ
0, V2(n,δ) − V2(n,δ
0) is single-crossing.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a novel approach to ordering information structures which is specially suited
to problems of information revelation in private value settings. In such settings, new information
will be perceived diﬀerently by diﬀerent people, raising the valuations of some while reducing that
of others, which leads to a more spread out distribution of expected valuations. The core idea of
the paper is to use this fact to build a family of informativeness criteria: an information structure
is more informative than another if it leads to a more disperse distribution of expected valuations.
More stringent notions of dispersion will lead to stronger informativeness criteria.
We focus on three ordered concept of dispersion (Bickel-Lehmann dispersion  single-crossing
dispersion  SOSD) and use them to characterize three ordered informativeness criteria (Supermodular-
precision  Single-crossing precision  Integral precision). We then apply this family of informa-
tiveness criteria to the auctioneer’s information revelation problem.
The weakest of our criteria, integral-precision, which is deﬁned using second order stochastic
dominance, has the important feature that it is implied by all standard informativeness criteria. In
addition, integral-precision allows us to obtain two important comparative static results with costless
provision of information: (i) if an information structure is more integral-precise than another, it will
generate a greater surplus, and (ii) if there are two bidders, the auctioneer obtains a lower expected
price when choosing a more integral-precise information structure, and greater integral-precision
leads to a greater expected price if there is enough competition. Hence, if providing information is
costless, integral-precision implies that the auctioneer’s incentives to provide information are lower
than the social ones since the eﬃcient policy is full information disclosure and information may
reduce the price. If there is enough competition, the incentives to provide information will be
positive and, in the limit, social and private incentives will coincide.
21The criterion of single-crossing precision is not implied by any of all standard informativeness
criteria. This criterion adds to the results obtained with integral-precision by establishing that the
incentives of the auctioneer to provide information increase with the number of bidders.
Our central notion of informativeness and the strongest one, sm-precision, allows us to obtain
comparative statics results with costly provision of information. Information increases bidders’
informational rents, and leads the auctioneer to optimally provide information to the market below
that which is eﬃcient. We also show that there is a strategic complementarity between information
and competition, so that both the eﬃcient level of investment in providing information to the market
and the auctioneer’s optimal investment increase with the number of bidders. We can also show
that both converge as the number of bidders goes to inﬁnity.
22A Appendix
A.1 A Suﬃcient Condition For Greater Supermodular-Precision
Supermodular-precision is based on the shape of the distribution of updated expected valuations. In
some cases this condition can be veriﬁed directly but at times, such as when looking at parameterized
families of bivariate distributions, one might prefer to use an informativeness condition based on
some property of the joint distribution function of signals and valuations.
In this section we identify one such condition that implies sm-precision. This condition is a mirror
image of Lehmann (1988)’s notion of eﬀectiveness and can be found in the statistics literature on
positive dependence:18
Deﬁnition 8 (Cap´ era` a and Genest (1990)) Let Fδ and Fδ0 be two joint distribution functions
with posterior distribution functions Fδ(v|π) and Fδ0(v|π). The distribution function Fδ is more
stochastically increasing in π than Fδ0, if the function:
γ(v,π) = F
−1
δ (Fδ0(v|π)|π) is nondecreasing in π. (3)
If Fδ(v|π) and Fδ0(v|π) are continuous in v for all π, then γ(v,π) is increasing in π and is




0) ⇒ Fδ0(v|π) ≥ Fδ(v
0|π)
Notice that Condition (3) appears in Lehmann (1988)’s deﬁnition of eﬀectiveness but with
valuations and signals interchanged.20
If, in addition, Fδ(v|π) is diﬀerentiable in δ and v, then greater sm-precision is also equivalent
18Positive dependence between two variables is the property that larger realizations of one variable are probabilis-
tically associated with larger realizations of another.
19See Fang and Joe (1992).
20Lehmann’s deﬁnition of eﬀectiveness also includes the requirement that both Fδ and Fδ0 have the monotone
likelihood ratio property.
23to the Spence-Mirrlees type condition:21
∂Fδ(v|π)/∂δ
∂Fδ(v|π)/∂v
is nondecreasing in π. (4)
Proposition 4 Suppose Fδ(v|π) and Fδ0(v|π) are diﬀerentiable in δ and v. If Fδ is more stochas-
tically increasing in π than Fδ0, then Fδ is more informative, in terms of sm-precision, than Fδ0.
Proof:
If Fδ is more stochastically increasing in π than Fδ0, then the Spence-Mirlees type condition (4)























∂Fδ(v|π)/∂v is decreasing in π, ∂W(π,δ)/∂δ is increasing in π, i.e. W(π,δ) is supermodular.
Summarizing, condition (3) can be interpreted as a mirror image of Lehmann’s eﬀectiveness
condition, and is suﬃcient to ensure that two information structures are ordered in terms of the
sm-precision of their signals.
A.2 Deﬁnitions and Preliminary Result
We make repeated use of the following very well-known result, which we state as a lemma: if
X ≥st Y , then for all nondecreasing functions ψ, E[ψ(X)] ≥ E[ψ(Y )].
Lemma 1 Let X and Y be real-valued random variables with cumulative distribution functions F
and G respectively, such that F(z) ≤ G(z) for all z ∈ R. For all bounded real-valued nondecreasing







21Jewitt (1997) gives a detailed comparison of diﬀerent notions of informativeness and illustrates the connection
between the standard Spence-Mirrlees condition and Lehmann’s notion of eﬀectiveness, which we use in the proof of
Proposition 4.
24We also use the following notation: Ui:j(x) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a
random variable Y such that Ui:j(x) = Pr(Y ≤ x). This random variable is the ith order statistic
from a sample of j independently and identically uniform distributed random variables over [0,1],
where U1:j refers to the cdf of the maximum of the sample, U2:j to the cdf of the second highest
realization in the sample and so on until Uj:j, which is the cdf of the minimum realization in the
sample. We will also make use of the functional form of U1:n, U1:n(π) = πn, π ∈ [0,1].
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Remark 1:
Applying the law of iterated expectations: µ = E[E[v|X]] = E[W(Π,δ)] and µ = E[E[v|X0]] =
E[W(Π0,δ
0)]. If X and Y , two random variables, have the same mean and X is more disperse than Y ,
then X is dominated by Y in terms of SOSD (Shaked and Shantikumar (1994), Theorem 2.B.10).
Proof of Theorem 1: We want to show that if δ > δ0 then V1(n,δ) ≥ V1(n,δ





0)) dU1:n(π) ≥ 0
By the law of iterated expectations, the expected valuation of the distribution of expected valuations,
E[W(π,δ)] = µ, must not depend on the information structure. Let U1:1(π) = π denote the









Deﬁne the function ψ(π) ≡ (W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0)). By the deﬁnition of sm-precision, ψ(π) is nonde-
creasing in π. As U1:n(π) = πn ≤ U1:1(π) for all n ≥ 1 and π ∈ [0,1], and ψ(π) is nondecreasing, we
can apply Lemma 1 and the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2: It suﬃces to show that V1(n + 1,δ) − V1(n,δ) ≥ V1(n + 1,δ
0) − V1(n,δ
0).
This is equivalent to showing
V1(n + 1,δ) − V1(n + 1,δ











As W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0) is nondecreasing in π and U1:n+1(π) = πn+1 ≤ U1:n(π) = πn for all π ∈ [0,1],
we can apply Lemma 1.
Proof of Corollary 1: Immediate from the results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and Theo-
rem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Part (i): We want to show that if δ > δ0 then V2(2,δ) ≤ V2(2,δ
0). With two bidders and prior to
their receiving their private signals, both have the same probability (1
2) of being the bidder with
the highest valuation. By the law of iterated expectations, the ex ante (before receiving the signal)











0)). From Theorem 1, V1(2,δ)−V1(2,δ
0) ≥ 0, which
implies V2(2,δ) − V2(2,δ
0) ≤ 0.
Part (ii): We want to show that there exists n0 such that for n ≥ n0, V2(n,δ)−V2(n,δ
0) ≥ 0. It
suﬃces to show ﬁrst that for all n, V2(n,δ)−V2(n,δ
0) is nondecreasing in n and then to demonstrate
that limn→∞ V2(n,δ) − V2(n,δ
0) > 0.
To show V2(n,δ) − V2(n,δ
0) is nondecreasing in n for all n we follow the same logic as in the
proof of Theorem 2:
V2(n + 1,δ) − V2(n + 1,δ












0) is nondecreasing in π and U2:n+1(π) ≤ U2:n(π) for all π ∈ [0,1], we can apply
Lemma 1.






converges to ψ(1) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We want to show that for δ > δ
0, Rw(n,δ) ≥ Rw(n,δ
0), i.e.
V1(n,δ) − V2(n,δ) ≥ V1(n,δ
0) − V2(n,δ
0)
This is equivalent to
V1(n,δ) − V1(n,δ












0) is nondecreasing in π and the stochastic dominance of the ﬁrst
order statistic over the second, U1:n(π) ≤ U2:n(π) for all π ∈ [0,1], we can apply Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 3: As in the proof of Theorem 2, it suﬃces to show that V2(n+1,δ)−V2(n,δ) ≥
V2(n + 1,δ
0) − V2(n,δ
0), and we have demonstrated this in the proof of Proposition 1, part (ii).
Proof of Corollary 2: Immediate from the results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and Theorem 3.









{V1(n,δ) − δ − Rw(n,δ)}
where Rw(δ) is as deﬁned in the text.
27Compare the formulation of the auctioneer’s problem to the formulation of the social welfare
maximization problem (equation (1)). As δ








Rw(δ) is nondecreasing (Proposition 2) so that if δ
A > δ
E, then this last equation would imply
E[W(Π1,δ
A) − δ
A] ≥ E[W(Π1, δ
E) − δ
E]
but this contradicts the fact that δ
E maximizes social surplus, so that δ
A ≤ δ
E.
To establish the second part of the Theorem, consider the informational rents, Rw(n,δ).












We know U1:n(π) = πn and U2:n(π) = nπn−1 − (n − 1)πn.




n→∞U1:n(π) − U2:n(π) = 0
As W(π,δ) is bounded and monotone in π, and (U1:n(π)−U2:n(π)) converges to zero then Rw(n,δ)









As information eventually becomes valuable, the objective function of the auctioneer approaches
total surplus as n goes to inﬁnity.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Part (i): We proceed by constructing an example of two information structures ordered in the
sense of Blackwell (1951) which are not ordered in the sense of sc-precision.
28Let V be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Let X be equal to 0 if v ∈ [0,1/2) and equal to 1 if
v ∈ [1/2,1]. Similarly, let Y distributed as follows
Y =

   
   
0 if v ∈ [0,1/4)
1 if v ∈ [1/4,1/2)
2 if v ∈ [1/2,3/4)
3 if v ∈ [3/4,1]
Clearly Y is more informative than X in the sense of Blackwell so that the information structure for
(V,Y ), denoted Fδ, is more informative than that for (V,X), denoted Fδ0, in the sense of Blackwell.
Nevertheless, E[v|X = 0] = 1/4 and E[v|X = 1] = 3/4, while
E[v|Y ] =

   
   
1/8 if Y = 0
3/8 if Y = 1
5/8 if Y = 2
7/8 if Y = 3




   
   
−1/8 if v ∈ [0,1/4)
1/8 if v ∈ [1/4,1/2)
−1/8 if v ∈ [1/2,3/4)
1/8 if v ∈ [3/4,1]
and Fδ and Fδ0 are not SC-ordered.
Part (ii): Let δ > δ
0. We want to rewrite W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0) to show MIO-ND implies



































































29If δ < δ
0 implies that the corresponding information structure is more informative according to




















0))dp ≤ 0, ∀π ∈ [0,1]
A.4 Other Results
In this section we prove several claims stated informally in the text.
A.4.1 Our two examples of precision
Example 1(normal distribution): Consider δ > δ
0 and let Φ(x) be the cumulative distribution
of a standard normal distribution, φ(x) the distribution function:






Fδ(x) = π = Φ




























⇒ W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0) = E[v|F
−1
















































Given the structure of the signal, the bidders’ expected valuation is
w(x,δ) = E [v|x]
= xiδ + (1 − δ)µ
⇒ w(x,δ) − w(x
0,δ) = δ(x − x
0)








So that for π > π0, ∂(W(π,δ) − W(π0,δ))/∂δ > 0.
A.4.2 Further Discussion of Section 5.2
In this section we provide a more detailed discussion of the statements made in Section 5.2.
Theorem 1 holds under weaker notions of precision, such as integral-precision. Using similar






where ψ(π) ≡ (W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0)) and let Ψ(b) =
R b
0 ψ(π)dπ. Greater integral precision implies
Ψ(π) ≤ 0,∀π ∈ [0,1].










where the last inequality holds as Ψ(π) ≤ 0, ∀π ∈ (0,1).
Then, if information provision is costless, the eﬃcient policy is to fully disclose all information—
and the ﬁrst part of Theorem 4 holds trivially.
Also, note that the proof of part (i) of Proposition 1 only makes use of Theorem 1. As this latter
result extends to the case where information structures are ordered by integral-precision, then under
this condition the value of information is also negative with only two bidders.
31As for the second part of the proposition, with integral-precision we can show that given any
δ
0 < δ, there exists a ˆ n such that for all n > ˆ n, V2(n,δ) > V2(n,δ
0). Let φ(n) ≡ V2(n,δ) − V2(n,δ
0),










This and the fact that
R 1
0 ψ(π)dπ = 0 implies ∀p ∈ [0,1],
R 1
p ψ(π)dπ ≥ 0. Let A = {p ∈ [0,1]|ψ(p) <
0} and ˆ p the highest p in the closure of A. Ignoring the trivial case that ψ(π) ≡ W(π,δ)−W(π,δ
0)
is equal to zero for all π, integral-precision implies that ˆ p ∈ (0,1) and there exists p1,p2 ∈ (ˆ p,1]
such that ∀π ∈ [p1,p2], ψ(π) > 0. Let c1 = minπ∈[0,p1) ψ(π)(1−π), and c2 = minπ∈[p1,p2] ψ(π)(1−π).
Notice that c1 < 0 and c2 > 0. Then
φ(n) ≥ n[p
n−1








n−1(c1 − c2) + c2]
Let











As p1/p2 < 1, then for all n > ˆ n, (p1/p2)n−1(c1 − c2) + c2 > 0, and φ(n) > 0.
Integral-precision provides limit results but it does not give us any predictions as to the mono-
tonicity of the optimal release of information. On the other hand, sc-precision does provide a
suﬃcient condition for the optimal release of information to be monotone in the number of bidders.
The reason is as follows: by sc-precision, W(π,δ) is single-crossing in (π,δ) (in the sense that for all
δ > δ
0, W(π0,δ) − W(π0,δ
0) ≥ (>)0 implies for all π > π0, W(π,δ) − W(π,δ
0) ≥ (>)0). The family





then, by the results in Athey (2002), V2(n,δ) is single-crossing in (n,δ) and the optimal choice of δ
is monotone in n.
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